In 2008, the Commission recognised that SAAs bring considerable benefits to market participants and took measures to facilitate the increased use of ASAs. In Regulation No 712, the Commission found that SAAs maximise the utilisation rate and value of pipeline capacity by creating a mechanism for capacity owners to use external experts to manage their capacity. The Commission found that WADA would lead to definitive savings for final consumers by reducing gas supply costs and making more efficient use of pipeline capacity. In order to facilitate increased use of AMSAs, the Commission exempted, in Regulation No 712, qualified AMSAs (those that meet certain requirements as regards the extent of gas supply or purchase obligations imposed by the asset manager) from the tendering requirements of the AUTHORITY`s rules for the release of pipeline capacity. This waiver – codified in section 284.8 of the FERC Rules – allows capacity holders to release pipeline capacity associated with an AMA to an asset manager without making the capacity available for tendering (although unlocks must continue to be made public). Recognising that WAAs are multiple agreements, the Commission has also exempted qualified WAMAs from its ban on releasing intergovernmental pipeline capacity under foreign conditions. Finally, the Commission found that the prohibition on buying/selling operations did not prevent a party from managing its own gas purchase contracts, but that it relied on an asset manager to manage its pipeline capacity, even though, on the other hand, such agreements might involve prohibited buy/sell transactions. The Commission`s prohibition on buying/selling operations — laid down in Regulation No 636 in 1992 — prohibits an intergovernmental pipeline owner from buying gas from a seller, transporting the gas on an intergovernmental pipeline, and then reselling the gas to the seller after leaving the pipeline — transactions that would allow a capacity owner to circumvent capacity-sharing requirements by allowing another party to use its pipeline capacity efficiently. While such buying/selling transactions are prohibited, the Commission granted, in Regulation No 712, `a derogation from the purchase/prohibition of sale for AMAs eligible for derogations from supply and refinement, but only for the quantities of gas delivered to the issuing consignor`. The Commission found that it was acceptable for a gas buyer to use an asset manager to manage its pipeline capacity, while retaining direct responsibility for gas purchases, whereas such purchases had to be sold to the asset manager managing the pipeline capacity, which could be contrary to the prohibition on buying/selling. However, in Regulation No 712, the Commission did not directly answer the question whether tax AMSAs would be exempted from the prohibition on buying/selling in the same way. AMSAs are contractual relationships in which an «asset manager» undertakes to manage another party`s gas supply and supply agreements, including its pipeline capacity.
In the case of a delivery AMA, a large gas buyer, for example. B a local distribution company or industrial user allocates its pipeline capacity (and possibly its gas purchase contracts) to an asset manager. WADA requires the asset manager to supply gas to the buyer when requested to do so in accordance with WADA`s terms. To the extent that there is excess capacity of pipelines or gas purchased in excess, the asset manager should maximise the value of those assets by making bulk sales or releasing pipeline capacity to third parties, with revenues shared in accordance with WADA. . . .