Table 2 shows the extent of coverage of negotiations, broken down by gender and worker status, for the eight countries where this information is available. The differences in coverage between the sexes are rather small. In all countries except Luxembourg, the rate of women is higher than that of men. Specific studies would be needed to explain the observed differences. However, the fact that senior managers are sometimes excluded from the scope of collective agreements, while women are under-represented in this group, probably contributes to the generally higher rate for women. In other countries, industrial negotiations set the pay and pay conditions for the vast majority of workers involved in the negotiations. This is the position in Austria, Germany, Portugal and Slovenia (although all but Austria have a number of enterprise agreements). Similar developments are taking place with regard to the extension of collective agreements, which are in force in the vast majority of the countries studied. While over the past ten years several adaptations, most of them minor, enlargement mechanisms have been made, the basic parameters and functions of the enlargement provisions have remained unchanged.
The remarkable earlier exception of the United Kingdom, where the extension provisions were abolished in 1980, does not call into question this general finding. The effects of the extension provisions on the collective agreement vary from country to country and cannot always be defined precisely. However, the available evidence supports the conclusion that the extension provisions are not substantial, either on base rates or on downward-oriented, top-down or downward tariffs. On the contrary, the extension provisions would have helped stabilize coverage. In the United Kingdom, negotiations are under way at the industrial level in certain sectors, such as Z.B, in the clothing and textiles and construction sectors, but in most cases in the private sector, negotiations are conducted at the corporate or corporate level. The same is true in Ireland and Malta (where no sectoral negotiations are under way outside the public sector). In Bulgaria, the formal structure is at two levels, at the industry and enterprise level, but in practice many agreements at the sectoral level are obsolete and it is agreements at the enterprise level that actually set conditions. This guide aims to help TRIPARTITE ILO voters collect data on labour relations, including union affiliation, reports on collective agreements and strikes and lockouts. Not all countries have been able to correct the raw data for the purposes of this study, in accordance with the above definition. In these cases, deviations from the definition are indicated.
The main differences concern Spain and Norway because of the excessive numbers caused by overcompensations resulting from complex negotiating systems. In the case of Norway, the extent of the error may be indicated assuming that the data available on the survey are exaggerated by 5 to 10%. On the other hand, the figures for Poland somewhat underestimate coverage. Indeed, a collective agreement, if concluded for an indeterminate period, will remain in force even after its termination until a new contract is signed. There is no data on the number of workers covered by these agreements. In addition, it was not possible for some countries to calculate the adjusted rate. However, the case of France shows why the figures should be treated with caution.